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1. INTRODUCTION 
Games and conflicts and their resolutions have 
existed everywhere ever since there were human 
beings. Hov to analyze the situations and form 
good strategies have been scattered in many his- 
torical records. The Principles of War [9] by 
Sun-Tau published about two thousand years ago is 
still one of the most important documents in 
military strategic analysis. However, due to 
Bore1 [4], Van Neumann and Morgenstern [lo] and 
Isaac6 [5] and their followers, games and con- 
flicts have been mathematically studied respec- 
tively in terms of psychological games, game 
theory and differential games. Their theoretic 
contributions have been great in the fields in- 
cluding mathematics, engineering, economics, 
social science, management etc.; but their real 
life applications have been far from the original 
expectation. This may be partially due to the 
strong but unrealistic assumptions needed for the 
beautiful mathematical results and partially due 
to that our views (habitual domain) might have 
been misled and fixed, and we are unwilling to 
see the problems in different angles. In second 
order games [ll], we try to perceive games and 
conflicts in different angles and provide some 
models for analysis and applications. 
In the next section, using examples we will ll- 
lustrate second order games in contrast to tradi- 
tional games. As habitual domain (HD) analysis 
is a key to resolve conflict, Section 3 is de- 
voted to brief discussion of HD. It points out 
that each player may be represented by an HD, 
when the HDs are entangled (conflicts) we need to 
restructure them to loosen the conflicts. Any 
arbitrary solution concepts without restructuring 
HD usually cannot dissolve the conflicts. To 
illustrate a mathematical analysis on restructur- 
ing to solve conflict, in Section 4 we sketch a 
general class of n-person which can be restruc- 
tured Into a new situation in which each player 
can claim a victory and to which each player is 
motivated to move. Some new research problems 
are sketched in Section 5. 
2. SECOND ORDER GAMES 
Example 2.1. Two players, a guard and a thief, 
are to operate (protect or steal) on two wars- 
houses (denoted by 1 and 2). One can define Pi, 
be the probability that the thief can be caught 
if he operates at j and the guard, at I. Here, 
i,j-1 or 2. The guard is then to choose a strst- 
egy to maximize P while the thief, to minimize 
it. This formolar on reduces the problem to a ‘I’ 
traditional zero-sum game. I” real life or sec- 
ond order games, the problems are not so simple. 
For Instance, the guard may consider “decoy” or 
“adding mechanical aid” as part of the alterna 
tives; his own life safety and future promotion 
may be as important as catching the thief; the 
outcomes of possible strategies and his own pref- 
erence or tradeoff over the outcomes may be fair- 
ly fussy and varying with time and his state of 
mind. Similarly, the thief may consider “setting 
fire on other building before his operation” as 
an alternative; life safety and ego satisfaction 
may be part of his criteria of action; outcomes 
of his choice and the preference over the pos- 
sible outcomes may be fairly fussy and varying 
with time and his state of mind. Indeed, the 
thief could be more successful if he could figure 
out the guard’s HD (habitual domain) and act 
outside of this BD. Similarly, the guard could 
be more successful in designing a good strategy 
if he knows his own HD and the thief’s RD. 
Example 2.2. (Adapted from [S]) A retiring 
Chairman of a corporation invited to his ranch 
two finalists (A 6 B) from which he would select 
his heir. A and B were given a black and white 
horse respectively. The Chairman gave a course 
for the horse race and said, “Starting at the 
same time, whoever’s horse is slower in complet- 
ing the course will be the next Chairman.” Fi- 
nally, A jumped on B’s horse and rode as fast as 
he could to the finish line. Naturally, A was 
the new Chairman. Note that “slower” in racing 
is out of our usual BD. This problem cannot be 
solved if A 6 B both stick to the fixed HD. It 
was A who could first jump out the HD and win the 
competition. 
Example 2.3. (Adapted from [g]) Once Liu-Pam (A 
Chinese Emperor about 2,000 years ago) and his 
troop was taken and surrounded by a” overwhelming 
army commanded by the King and Queen of an ear- 
lier tribe of Mongolia. In this desperate cri- 
sis. Chen-Ping, a wise aide to the Emperor. de- 
rived a” innovative strategy to dissolve the 
crisis. 
“A famous artist was asked to paint a” imagina- 
tively charming and beautiful lady. The painting 
was secretly sent to Mongolia’s queen with the 
message that the charming lady was going to be 
offered to the King for his victory and that she 
was so charming and atttactive that the current 
queen would be surely abdicated.” 
Oo that night, the Queen, beloved and trusted by 
the King, subtly told the King that she had had a 
deadly dream the night before that both of them 
were killed in a battle with Chinese troops. She 
then successfully persuaded the King to retreat 
to cherish their love the next day! 
Observe that to the Queen, the glory of conquer- 
ing China was not as important as to have the 
King’s love and that the thought of being abdi 
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cated was not fun at all! From the Ring's point 
of view, it was much better to be alive as a King 
than to be killed in battle. The glory of con- 
quering China could of course "ever make up for 
the death of himself. 
Note that the above brilliant strategy cannot be 
studied by traditional games and cannot be formed 
without thorough understanding the HDs of all the 
players involved. Note that in this second order 
games, new players were introduced to reframe the 
game, which led to solutions. 
With the above examples as lubricant, we can 
summarize the main differences between second 
order games and traditional game models In Table 
1. 
Table 1. Difference between Second Order Games 
and Traditional Game Models 
DeCielO" Second Order Traditional Game 
Elements Game5 Models 
Alternatives Varies with Fixed set 
Decision 
criteria 
Outcomes of 
decision 
Preference 
I"formatio" 
inputs and 
their pro- 
cessing 
Players 
time, gener- 
ated as needed 
Multiple ctf- 
teria usually 
varies with 
time and situa- 
tions 
Fixed single cri- 
terion 
Outcomes speci- Decision outcome is 
fied with con- usually determi- 
fidence which nistic and occs- 
may vary with sionally with know" 
time and situa- probability distri- 
tions butions 
Preference. 
dominance and 
satisficing can 
all vary with 
time 
One fixed-valued 
function 
Vary with time, 
they are impor- 
tant parts of 
"strategies," 
and must be 
considered 
Rarely or never 
considered 
May be hidden 
or change with 
time 
Well known to all 
players 
The formulation of second order games can be 
based on the decision elements listed in Table 
1. The following solution concepts are impor- 
tant. 
Definition 2.1. (Time Optimality) Decision 
x; is [tl. t21 - optimal for player i if it is 
perceived as the unique nondominated alternative 
over the time period [tl, t2]. 
Definition 2.2. (Tine Stability) The joint 
decision x* * (x* l,...*X;) for n-person games is 
[tl. t21 - stable, if each x;, j - l,...,", is 
rt;, tj1 - optimal for the jth player and [cl, 
t21 c 
2 1 
[tl. tj1. 
Under some suitable conditions one can derive 
necessary and sufficient conditions for time 
optimality and time stability. The conditions 
generalize the maximum principle of optimal con- 
trol problems and the semiperable conditions of 
differential games. The interested reader is 
referred to [ll]. 
3. HABITUAL LXXiAINS 
As discussed in the previous section, habitual 
domains (HD) plays a vital role in second order 
games. The concept deserves a careful study. It 
has been recognized that each human being has 
habitual ways to respond to stimuli. These are 
sometimes called conditioned or programmed behav- 
iors. For example, each individual has habitual 
ways of eating, dressing, and speaking. Some 
habitually emphasize economical gains , while 
others habitually emphasize social reputation. 
Some are habitually persistent in their goal 
pursuit, while others habitually change their 
objectives. Some are habitually optimistic and 
see the positive side, while others are habitu- 
ally pessimistic and see the negative side. Some 
habitually pay attention to the details; while 
others only to generalities. 
These habitual ways of perceiving, thinking, 
responding and acting can be captured by the 
concept of habitual domains (HD). Classifying 
from the behavior functions we see that HD in- 
volves self-suggestions, external information 
inputs, physiological monitoring, goal setting, 
state val"atlo", charge structures, attention and 
discharges. They also involve encoding, storing, 
retrieving and interpretation mechanisms. When a 
particular aspect or function is emphasized, it 
will be designated as "HD on that function." 
Thus, HD on self-suggestion, HD on charge struc- 
tures, HD on attention, etc. all follow. When 
the responses to a particular event are of lnter- 
est, we can designate them as "HD on the re- 
sponses to that event.- Thus, HD on seeking 
jobs. expressing opinions, dealing with friends, 
etc. also follow. In the following discussion, 
HD are used without specifying the corresponding 
functions, or events, as only the general proper- 
ties of HD will be discussed. Our introduction 
here is based on [12, 1, 13, 141. 
3.1 Elements of Habitual Domains 
A habitual domain at time t, denoted by HDt is 
defined as the collection of the following: 
(i) PD (potential domain): The collection of 
Ideas/act ens E that can be potentially activated 
at time t; 
(ii) AD 
actions F, 
(actual domain): The set of ideas/ 
t at is actually activated at time t; 
(iii) APt (activation probability): The activa- 
tion probability or confidence structure at time 
t which indicates the possibility for a subset of 
ideas/actions in PDt to be in ADt; 
(Iv) R(IE. Ok) (reachable domain): The reach- 
able (atta nab e) set of ideas/actions from the 
initial set of iheas It through the set of opera- 
tors Ot. 
R(It, Ot) shall be described more extensively 
shortly. Observe that AD C PD . 
shin between AD& and PD_ f i 
The relation- 
s simi ar to that be- 
tween the realired "al": and the sampling space 
of a random variable. The probability or confi- 
dence level (AP ) for a set of ideas/actions to 
be activated WI E 1 depend on how strongly the 
ideas/actions have been encoded and how easily 
the ideas/actions can be retrieved from memory 
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storage. It is also closely related to the set 
of initially activated ideas around the time t. 
Now consider reachable domains. Through self- 
suggestion and/or external information inputs, 
one idea or a set of ideas can be used to stlmu- 
late or generate other ideas. This suggests that 
a set of operators exists, defined on the subsets 
of PDt, which generates ideas in PDt from the 
subsets of PDt. As an example, suppose that one 
is interested in investing a fixed amount of cash 
in stocks A and B. The concept (the operator) 
that any portfolio (a convex combination) of A 
and B would also be of interest will expand the 
alternative set of A and B into the set of all 
convex combinations of A and B. Note, the oper- 
ators are also elements of PDt. 
Let It be a set of ideas with It c PDt, and let 
Ot be a set of operators which generate ideas in 
PDt from subsets of PDt. Define R(It, Ot), 
called reachable domain, to be the set of Ideas/ 
actions that can be reached (or attained) from It 
and Ot. More precisely, R(It, Or) is the set of 
ideas/actions that can be cumulatively generated 
by any sequence of operators from the set Ot 
which act on It and the resulting ideas/actions 
from the operations. As an example, let It = 
IO,11 and Ot = {+] (“+” is the ordinary mathemat- 
ical addition). Then R(It, Ot) is the sat of all 
nonnegative integers. If Ot - {+,-], then R(It, 
Ot) is the set of all integers. 
Potential and reachable domains are closely re- 
lated. We say that {It, O,] is a generator of 
PDt iff PDt = R(It, Ot), and (I,, O,] is a basis 
for PDt iff {I,, Ot] is a generator of PDt &no 
strict subset of {I,, Ot] is a generator of PDt. 
Finally we observe that HDt, as defined, is dy- 
namic and changes with time. All four elements 
of HDt can evolve with time: this makes analysis 
of BDt fairly difficult. Fortunately, it can be 
shown that HDt can reach a stable state; thus 
human behaviors are still, to a certain degree, 
predictable. This will be discussed in the next 
subsection. 
3.2 Stable Habitual Domains: Existence and 
Implications 
Our BDt as a function of t will reach its stable 
state. The main reason is that the more we 
learn, the less is the possibility that the ar- 
riving message or information is new to us. Thus 
unless extraordinary events occur, over a period 
of time we will develop a set of habitual ways of 
thinking, acting and reacting. 
Based on the activation of patterns of neural 
circuits, one can show that APt would reach its 
stable state under some proper condttions 111. 
Here we give a simple proof for the stability of 
PDt. 
Let at be the number of additional new ideas or 
concepts acquired during [t-l, t]. {a,] may not 
be monotonic. It may have some pattern of perio- 
dicity, as a result of bio-rhythms or rhythms of 
the environment. 
Theorem 3.1. (Imbedding Theory) Assume that 
there is a subsequence. 
(a : 
‘k 
k - 1. 2,...) C $1 
and constants D and M. Such that 
(i) 1 a - D 
k ‘k 
‘k+l-‘k 
(ii) 1 $l4a 
i-l 
as k+i 
‘k 
then 1 at converges. 
t 
Proof 
‘Z-*1 
i at - Is1 at + 1 as +i 
t-o t-o i-1 1 
=3-‘2 
+ 1 as +i+ . . . 
i-l 2 
*1 
,< I: at + M(a + a + . ..) 
t-o *1 s2 
Sl 
,< lat+KD<- 
t-o 
Once PDt and APt reach their stable states. one 
can expect AD, to occur at some regularity. In 
such stable states of BD,, one can expect habit- 
ual ways of thinking, responding, and reacting to 
stimuli and events to occur. Thus, personality, 
attitude, conditioned or programmed behavior, 
will be formed for each individual. Such forma- 
tion has a great impact on decision making styles 
and optimization theories. The existence of 
stable HD has significant implications for high 
stake decision problems, optimal solutions, gam- 
ing and conflict dissolution, career management 
and leadership. Being limited by the space we 
briefly describe some of them. For the details 
and more, the reader is referred to [l, 131. 
(i) On the high stake decision problems: Al- 
though the decision elements (alternatives, cri- 
teria, perceived outcomes of decisions and pref- 
erence) can vary with respect to time. informa- 
tion inputs, and psychological states of the 
decision maker, they can become stabilized. (See 
[Z] for an empirical study.) Applications of 
optimization theories to high stake decision 
problems become feasible. Before the stabiliza- 
tion, a formal analysis using optimization theory 
is not fruitful. During the transition period it 
might be better to let our BDt open and expand, 
allowing vigilant search for all relevant infor- 
mation on the decision elements, making sure 
“good” alternatives are not overlooked. 
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(ii) 
esses 
13” optimal solutions: As decision proc- 
depend on HDt, so do the resulting optimal 
sol”tio”s. Since HDt can vary over time (even 
though it is in a stable state most of the t,ime), 
optimal solutions will change with time. This 
occurs when the set of alternatives, the set of 
criteria, dimension of alternatives, perception 
of outcomes, and/or preference change. This 
suggests that in dynamic settings, “time- 
optimality” is important and that an alternative 
perceived as optimal is valid only over a time 
horizon. Today’s optimal solution will not “e- 
cessarily be optimal forever. As HDt changes, it 
may become a” inferior solution. (See [ll. 131 
for further details.) Being aware of this fact, 
one can avoid surorise over other D~OD~~'S "ir- 
rational” decisions. After all, a’decisio” is 
rational if and only if it is consistent with the 
decision maker’s HD+. Everyone’s HDt is unique. 
What one perceives as irrational may be vary 
rational from other people’s point of view (HDt). 
(iii) On gaming and conflict dissolution: Each 
player has a unique HDtz Understanding one-s own 
HDt and one-8 opponents HDt is essential to 
winning competitive games or resolving conflicts. 
If one knows his own HDt but does not know one-s 
opponents’ HDt, one cannot confidently construct 
a winning strategy. Indeed one could lose the 
game entirely, like the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
(See [6] for a detailed discussion of the mis- 
take.) If one does not know both his own and his 
opponents- HD he very likely would lose most 
games. (For E’ urther discussion on war games, see 
191.) 
In games which are partially cooperative and 
partially competitive (like international trade 
or companies competing for market share and mar- 
ket volume with the same kinds of products), it 
may be desirable for the players to settle a” 
agreement. To maintain some stability, this 
agreement must allow each player to declare a 
victory -- i.e.. the terms of agreement must be a 
time-optimal solution from the point of view of 
each player’s HDt. Certainly this is not a” easy 
task. Proposing new alternatives, creating new 
conceptions of the criteria and suggesting out- 
comes for the players to change their correspond- 
ing HDt will become vital. Without a new set of 
compatible HDts, agreement can hardly be reached. 
Certainly, to successfully restructure HD one 
must first be aware of the existing HDt o ! each 
player. In [ll], one can find some systematic 
ways for restructuring HDS. 
4. GAME RESTRUCTURING AND CONFLICT DISSOLUTION 
In abstract each player has unique HD. Each 
game, a8 a “living system,” also has HD. Re- 
structure the HDs of the players and the game so 
that each player can claim a victory is a key to 
dissolve conflict. In this section we shall 
illustrate hov this can be achieved. 
Example 4.1. Consider the following payoff ma- 
trix of a two-person game, in which the first and 
second numbers are the payoffs to the row and 
column player respectively. Thus (0, 15) means 
that if the row player uses “cooperation” and 
column player usas “noncooperation” then the 
payoff is 0 and 15 to the row and column player 
respectively. Note that “noncooperation” ia the 
unique “ondominated choice for both players, 
Independent of other player’s choice, which leads 
to payoff (5, 5) which will be later called a 
self-interested stable point. Note that it is 
not a group stable point because (12, 12) la 
better for both players and there is temptation 
to cooperate to get (12, 12). 
Noncoop. Cooperation 
Noncoop. 
cooperation 
Example 4.2. 
Noncoop. 
Cooperation 
Noncoop. Cooperation 
[I:: s) (z: $) 
In this game “cooperation” is the best choice for 
both players, Independent of the other’s choice. 
The payoff (12, 12) is also a group stable point 
because cooperatively. the players cannot do 
better. 
Our problem is to restructure game of Example 4.1 
into that of Example 4.2 so that both players can 
claim a victory in the new game. To offer an 
analytical result, let us consider a general 
class of n-person games with player 
i c{1,2...., n] who chooses variable: 
xis[O,l] = Xi and his payoff is Ai(xl,...,x”). 
Note that Ai depends on xi and xj, jfi. POX. 
simplicity let 
n 
x - (x l*‘..‘X”) X - ll Xi and A - 
i-l 
(A l....>An). When xi is emphasized, we write 
x - (Xi, x,) where xieXi, 
^ . 
xisXi - II Xj. Thus Ai = Ai(xi, xi). 
j+i 
Definition 4.1. x* = (x;, ii*), l-l,...,“, is a 
self-interest stable point in X If 
* ^ 
Ai(xi,xi) 2 Ai(xi,xi), for all i,xicXi and 
_ * 
xi EXi . 
l 
Definition 4.2. x EX is a Pareto optimal aolu- 
tion If there is no xcX so that A(x) 2 A(x*), and 
A(x) f A(x*). That is, Ai >, Ai( for each 
i-l,...,“, and strict inequality holds for at 
least one I. 
Note that Pareto optimality is a group stability. 
If each one has cooperative spirit and requests 
change of decision only when no one gets hurt or 
is worse off, then, once Pareto optlmality is 
reached, it remains there. 
Definition 4.3. x*sX is a stable solution if it 
Is a self-interest stable point and a Pareto 
optimal point. 
Without confusion let A represents both an 
“-person game with strategy defined on X and the 
payoff of the game. Given a game A, its reframed 
new game will be denoted by x. 
Two sets of criteria are needed for restructuring 
games. The first sat is that in the new game 
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each player can claim a victory and the other is 
that there is incentive for the players to mnve 
to the new games. 
Criteria for Stability of the New Game: (11) -- 
there exists a unique self-interest stable point 
x*; (12) The self-interest stable point x* is 
also Pareto optimal; and (13) x* maximizes s 
group collective payoff 
&iii(X), x*>o, i-l,. . . ,n. 
Any game A satisfying (Il)-(13) is called a 
strongly stable game. 
Assumed that x”cX is the ststus quo point of the 
* 
current game A, while x EX is the desired solu- 
tion to be achieved through the new game A”. We 
have : 
Criteria for incentives t” adopt new games: (Jl) 
For each i-l,...,“, 
;i,(x*)-A~(x*)>A~(x’), (i.e., each one is better 
off in the new game); (52) For each i-l,...,“, 
iii’x;,;i’ 2 Ai( for all xi’Xi, (i.e., 
using x; is better in the new game than in the 
old 
For 
all 
off 
the 
game, independent of others’ choice); (53) 
each I - I,...,“, A&, 
_ 
xi) > Ai( for 
. ^ l 
xi E xi. (i.e., using xi results in better 
in the new game than the current payoff in 
old game, independent of others’ choice); 
(54) &(~)-<~iA~(x), for all XEX. (i.e., bud- 
get wise, the restructuring is feasible without 
outside help). 
The following is derived in 171. 
Theorem 4.1. Let A be a game with continuous 
first derivatives on X. Assume that +(x*) > 
Ai(x 0 ), for all i-1 ,..., n. Then, there exist 
positive constants 
{bl,..., b”) and (cl,.... cn] so that the new game 
A”, defined by 
jii(s)-Ai(X)-biIX1-siI+CI I: 1x*-x 1, 
jti j j 
satisfies criteria 11-13 and 
stsnts can be chosen so that 
all l-l,...,“. 
Example 4.3. The payoffs of 
represented by: 
A1(%y) - 2xy - 5x + 1oy + 5 
51-34. The con- 
bi*b and ci-c, for 
Example 4.1 can be 
(1) 
A2(%y) * 2xy + 10x - 5y + 5 (2) 
where x and y are the choice variables for the 
row and the column players respectively. 
Let bi-ci-7, i-1,2. Then (l), (2) becomes 
A~(X,Y) - 2xy + 2x + 3y + 5 
- 2xy + 3x + 2y t 5 
which yield the payoff matrix of Example 4.2. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have introduced the concepts of second order 
games and habitual domain analysis and illus- 
trated how can games and conflicts can be solved 
by understanding HDs and restructuring HDs. Many 
important research problems need to be explored, 
including (i) find effective ways for classifying 
and identifying HDs; (ii) understand the interac- 
tion of different HDs; (iii) find effective ways 
for moving current HDt to an ides1 HDt; (iv) 
apply habitual domain analysis t” the problems 
listed in Section 3 as well as in second order 
games. 
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